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Abstract: The work presented in this paper was performed in collaboration with one of 
the largest Public Transportation Operator in Portugal and addresses the problem of risk 
assessment due to terrorist actions involving explosions at different levels. First, a 
region of the Operator is selected. The elements in the Operator’s network with the 
highest associated risk are highlighted for each threat using the COUNTERACT 
guidelines. Subsequently, from the group of elements with the highest associated risk, 
an element is selected for structural safety evaluation under blast loading. Through 
numerical analysis, different explosion scenarios are studied and the behavior of the 
structure is presented. 
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism has been described as the deliberate use of violence to create a sense of 
shock, fear and outrage in the mind of the target population [1]-[3]. Armed attacks and 
bombings constituted nearly 80% of all terrorist attacks in 2011. Suicide attacks 
accounted for just 2.7% of terrorist attacks in 2011 but 21% of all terrorism-related 
fatalities, a fact that underscores their extreme lethality. IEDs (Improved Explosive 
Devices) were the most frequently used and deadliest terrorist weapon employed [4]. In 
the year of 2011, over two-thirds of all terrorist attacks struck infrastructure or facilities. 
Of those, transportation assets and public places were the most frequently targeted. 
Transportation facilities – such as vehicles, buses and transportation infrastructure – 
incurred damage in about 39% of the attacks, while public places – including communal 
areas, markets, polling stations, religious institutions, schools and residences – incurred 
damage in about 28% of the attacks [4]. 
One of the reasons that make this easy to achieve is that developed societies have 
become very dependent on complex and fragile systems (railways, airlines, gas 
pipelines, electricity infrastructure, large shopping areas and business centers, etc.) 
which are both vulnerable and critical to society’s functions, and provide the terrorists 
with many suitable targets. Attackers can use various weapon systems in different 
combinations and such events cannot be predicted. However, reliable information and 
objective threat and risk assessment can produce effective estimates of such incidents. 
Risk Assessment must be understood as a step or a process inside the Risk Management 
model. Figure 1 shows a simplified representation of the Risk Management model. Risk 
Management is a systematic and analytical process by which an organization identifies, 
reduces, and controls its potential risks and losses [5]. This process allows organizations 
to determine the magnitude and effect of the potential loss, the likelihood of such loss 
actually happening, and the countermeasures that could lower the probability or 
magnitude of loss. 
The first step is to conduct a threat assessment where the threat or hazard is identified, 
defined and quantified. The next step of this model is to identify the values of the asset 
that need to be protected. Once the asset values are known, the next step is to conduct a 
vulnerability assessment with an evaluation of the potential vulnerability of the critical 
assets against the identified threats or hazards. The next step is the risk assessment: by 
analyzing the threat, asset value, and vulnerability it is possible to ascertain the level of 
risk for each critical asset against applicable threats. The final step of this model is to 
consider mitigation options. Risk assessment on its own incorporates the first four steps 
described. 
There are a number of methods available to conduct an organization’s risk assessment, 
and the steps can be accomplished in different sequences. Examples are given in: 
 FEMA 452, from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, USA, How-To 
Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings – considers a 
comprehensive methodology to prepare a risk assessment, providing means to 
assess the risk to the assets and to make risk-based decisions on how to mitigate 
those risks. The primary use of this methodology is for buildings, although it 
could be adapted for other types of critical infrastructure [6]. 
 ISO 31000, International Standards Organization, International Standard: Risk 
Management – provides organizations with guiding principles, a generic 
framework, and process for managing risk. It gives emphasis to considering risk 
in terms of the effect of uncertainty on objectives, rather than the risk incident 
[7]. 
 DEMA (The RVA model), from the Danish Emergency Management Agency, 
Approach to Risk and Vulnerability Analysis for Civil Contingency Planning – 
has developed a generic scenario-based model for risk and vulnerability 
analysis. The model is developed for government agencies with responsibilities 
for society’s critical functions [8]. 
 UFC 4-020-01, from the Department of Defence, USA, DoD Security 
Engineering Facilities Planning Manual – it includes a procedure for risk 
analysis as a part of a preliminary design criterion [9]. 
All the previous methodologies have one common objective: to apply a quantitative 
assessment process that identifies the assets at highest risk. One key factor that can lead 
to an effective risk assessment is the selection of the entities/people brought into the 
process. This assessment should have inputs from, but not limited to, police agencies, 
intelligence agencies, structural engineers and national emergency management 
agencies. 
Modern society is heavily dependent on transportation networks. In the past 60 years, 
these networks have been an appropriate target for terrorists [10]. They allow easy 
access and provide suitable cover for escape. They also provide concentrations of 
civilians and their slaughter never fails to generate high levels of public interest, both 
national and international. The attacks on the Spanish railway network in Madrid in 
March 2004, the Metro and Bus strikes in London in July 2005, the Mumbai train 
attacks in July 2006 and the bombing in the international arrival hall of Moscow's 
busiest airport in January 2011, among many others, all point to public passenger 
transport networks as being suitable terrorist targets. 
COUNTERACT (Cluster Of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to anti-
terrorist ACTivities) was an European research project set up to improve security 
against terrorist attacks aimed at public passenger transport, intermodal freight transport 
and energy production and transmission infrastructure [11]. The project focused on the 
protection of critical transport infrastructures, public transport passengers and goods. It 
reviewed the existing security policies, procedures, methodologies and technologies to 
identify the best practices, which in turn have been promoted throughout the relevant 
security community in the EU. One of the main objectives of the project was to develop 
generic guidelines for conducting risk assessment in public transport networks. 
This paper presents a risk assessment performed on a large Public Transport Operator in 
Portugal that allowed identifying the elements with the highest risk regarding each 
analyzed threat. From the elements with the highest risk, one was selected for a 
structural safety assessment regarding possible explosion scenarios. 
 
2. Risk assessment 
As stated previously, transportation infrastructure is the most targeted type of 
infrastructure when it comes to terrorist attacks. A risk assessment was performed on 
one of the largest Public Transportation Operator in Portugal. For confidentiality 
reasons, the Operator will be kept anonymous as it is not essential for the presented 
analysis. Performing a risk assessment analysis allows identifying the elements in the 
network with the highest risk regarding a specific threat and provides the decision 
makers with essential tools to prioritize possible interventions. The COUNTERACT 
methodology was chosen for its specific character regarding Public Transportation 
Operators. Next, the procedure and the obtained results will be presented. 
2.1. Identify key infrastructure 
In order to identify possible targets for attacks it is necessary to structure the whole PT 
(Public Transport) system in an operational diagram. To structure the system it is 
important to address, namely, the following aspects [11]: 
a) How attractive is the city/region for terrorists compared to others? 
b) How attractive is the PT system for terrorists compared to other potential targets 
in the city/region? 
c) Which system elements are most attractive for terrorists? 
d) Which parts of the network are most critical to the operation? 
e) What is the number of passengers in interchange/stations/stops, vehicles (at peak 
times)? 
f) Is there special/ large events organized nearby that could temporarily raise the 
risk level? 
g) Are there institutions/ organizations nearby that generate a group of passengers 
which is at special risk? 
 
A total of 73 elements were located in the selected part of the Operator’s network. The 
types of elements located in the area under study were stations, administrative offices 
and operational centers. In order to focus the study on the elements with the highest 
relevance for the whole network, five criteria were considered on all elements. The 
selection of the criteria took into account the internal methodology for characterization 
of elements used by the Operator, being: a) C1 – passenger flow; b) C2 – service 
provided; c) C3 – mobility; d) C4 – significance; e) C5 – location, as indicated below. 
Different values for the sub-criteria and weights should be used for different Operators 
and conditions. 
 
2.1.1. C1 – Passenger flow: 
The number of passenger starting or ending a journey at an element is an important 
indicator. This influences the design and maintenance of the element, and regarding this 
specific study, provides a direct relation with the potential victims of a possible attack. 
For each station a value of C1 is assigned based on the following equations: 
C1i =  
ẑ௜ < 10	000 ṥ1௜ = ൬ ẑ௜ −ẑ௠௜௡10	000−ẑ௠௜௡ × 25 
(1) 
10	000	 ≤ ẑ௜ < 50	000 ṥ1௜ = ൬ ẑ௜ − 10	00050	000− 10	000 × 25 + 25 
50	000	 ≤ ẑ௜ < 250	000 ṥ1௜ = ൬ ẑ௜ − 50	000250	000− 50	000 × 25 + 50 
ẑ௜ ≥ 250	000 ṥ1௜ = ൬ ẑ௜ − 250	000ẑ௠௔௫ − 250	000 × 25 + 75 
Where C1i is the value of criteria C1 for element i; Vi is the monthly passenger flow for 
element i; Vmin is the minimum monthly passenger flow for all elements under 
analysis; and Vmax is the maximum monthly passenger flow for all elements under 
analysis. 
 
2.1.2. C2 – Service provided: 
The service provided at a specific element affects the distance covered during the 
journey, the amount of time a passenger stays in the element, and the frequency of 
transport, among other aspects. The service reflects the tributary area associated with 
the element. The services considered should be those provided by the Operator. As an 
example, for Operators regarding train transportation, the services could be: Suburban, 
Regional, Inter-Regional, Inter-City, and International; or any other provided by the 
Operator. For each element, a value of C2 is assigned based on the following equation: 
ṥ2௜ = Ѷẋ௣௜ (2) 
Where Spi takes the values 0.270, 0.105, 0.105, 0.270 and 0.250 for Suburban, 
Regional, Inter-Regional, Inter-City and International services, respectively. These 
weights and services are only an example, as disclosing the real services provided by 
the Operator could be used to its identification. 
 
2.1.3. C3 – Mobility: 
The complementary services and the offered transport conditions at a specific element 
should take into account the mobility regarding other transport modes (soft modes, 
highway, railway, sea, aerial, etc.). The connection with other services affects the 
station capacity and construction layout. This criterion takes into account the different 
services provided at each element. For each station a value of C3 is assigned based on 
the following equation: 
ṥ3௜ = Ѷṹ௜ (3) 
Where Mi takes the value 0.05 for soft modes, private cars or taxis; the value 0.15 for 
buses, trams or trains; and the value 0.20 for underground metro, boats or ferries. 
 
2.1.4. C4 – Significance: 
This criterion reflects the significance of each element according to its nature, and it is 
one of the most difficult criteria to define. However a few parameters could be defined 
to help verifying if the element gathers the necessary conditions to be labelled as 
significant for each predefined level, see examples in Table 1. For this work, five levels 
of significance were defined, namely: National, Regional, Touristic, Architectural and 
Network. For each station a value of C4 is assigned based on the following equation: 
ṥ4௜ = Ѷẋ௜ (4) 
 
2.1.5. C5 – Location: 
This criterion takes into account the location of the element. The selected elements for 
this study are located in 12 municipalities of a selected part of Portugal. The value of 
this criterion is proportional to the population of each municipality and ranges from 1.0 
to 0.0 for the highest population to the lowest population, respectively. The number of 
inhabitants for each municipality was taken from the national census of the year 2011 
[12]. 
 
2.1.6. Final score: 
Other criteria could be selected in this first step. Events such as large concerts, sports 
events or outdoor activities that imply a large number of people using a specific element 
at a specific time could lead to a different classification of the element. The dynamics of 
this process is an important feature and shows the relevance of “real time” monitoring. 
In order to achieve the final ranking score of each element in the network the following 
equation was applied: 
ṥ௜ = 0.51 × ṥ1 + 0.13 × C2 + 0.13 × C3 + 0.13 × C4 + 0.10 × C5 (5) 
Again, the weights selected for each criterion can be different according to the specific 
network under study or taking into account different selected criteria. It should be noted 
that the passenger flow is taken as the most important parameter, with about 50% of the 
weight. 
These five criteria were applied to all elements of the network and a ranking score was 
achieved. An acceptable threshold should be defined by the team selected to perform the 
risk assessment, before proceeding with the analysis. Here, a threshold of 0.6 was 
selected, meaning that every element with this score and higher was taken to the next 
steps of the COUNTERACT process. Table 2 shows the individual scores for selected 
examples of elements in this network. As a result of this first step, 14 elements were 
selected with scores higher than 0.6. 
 
2.2. Probability of occurrence 
In this step, each element is linked to the selected threats. For the purpose of this study, 
only threats involving explosions were selected. Five levels were selected according to 
the capacity of the delivery system, namely: a) Suicide vest (9 kg TNT); b) Luggage (25 
kg TNT); c) Car (500 kg TNT); d) Van (1 500 kg TNT); e) Truck (25 000 kg TNT). 
The calculation of the probability of occurrence for each threat and each element 
implies a research on previous and similar attacks and attempts. COUNTERACT 
defines the probability of occurrence as a 5 level scale (Table 3) according to the 
frequency that the threat has been executed in their own or in other public transport 
operations [11]. Table 4 shows some examples of previous attacks on PT Operators 
after the year 2000. 
After crossing the information of previous attacks on similar PT Operators and their 
delivery systems, a value of Probability of Occurrence (Table 3) is assigned to each 
threat and for each element, with the results shown in Table 5. As can be seen the 
highest value for probability of occurrence is 3. No threat has been executed within the 
own organization, but similar threats has been executed repeatedly within other PT 
Operators worldwide, including neighboring countries 
 
2.3. Severity of occurrence 
Impact/Severity stands for the damage to an asset arising from the execution of a threat, 
which is measured in escalating categories. COUNTERACT suggests a 4-level scale 
(Table 6), where the criteria for differentiation between the different levels focus mainly 
on the consequences of the various threats for persons, property and PT operator [11]. 
The final classification for the Impact would be the maximum of the three 
consequences. 
In the case of consequences for persons, the impact value was estimated according to 
previous attacks with similar delivery systems and the number of passengers at peak 
time for each element. The consequences for property were estimated studying the 
layout of the element. For each element, a minimum standoff distance was established 
regarding each threat. As an example, it might be possible that a car, van or truck cannot 
get closer than several meters from a given element, while an armed vest can get close 
to most elements. It is possible to estimate the maximum overpressure resulting from an 
explosion according to the standoff distance of its charge using simple empirical 
equations available in [13][14], see Figure 2. Although the damage resulting from an 
explosion is dependent on the maximum pressure and its duration (impulse) it was 
considered enough, in order to simplify the analysis, to use the maximum pressure as a 
damage indicator. Later, when analyzing the elements with the highest associated risk, a 
more detail analysis should be performed. Reference charts, where pressure thresholds 
are presented for different construction materials, were used to estimate the damage on 
each element for each threat. Examples of these reference charts can be found in 
[15][16]. The consequences for the PT Operator were estimated according to previous 
attacks on similar size elements. Studying the time while the attacked PT Operators 
ceased functions on a similar size element due to similar threats, it is possible to have an 
estimation of the required time for this PT Operator. Following these premises the final 
consequences were determined for the elements under study, see Table 7. 
 2.4. Risk matrix 
The combination of Probability of Occurrence and Impact/Severity results in the Risk 
categories applying the following equation [11]: 
Risk = Probability of Occurrence × Impact/Severity (6) 
COUNTERACT [11] suggests four risk categories according to their score (Table 8) 
and the subsequent required action. 
With the scores for the Probability of Occurrence and the Severity of Occurrence is 
possible to plot the Risk Matrix shown in Table 9. Because the Portuguese PT Operator 
has no previous occurrences of attacks, there is no combination with disastrous 
classification. Some combinations scored a critical classification (8-12) due to similar 
attacks on neighboring countries and the respectively delivery systems (9-25 kg TNT), 
with easy “infiltration” and possibility to achieve low standoff distances. 
This methodology is relatively easy to apply and provides the PT Operator with tools to 
quantify the relative risk for its elements. It must be kept in mind that this is a dynamic 
process and requires “real time” updates whenever there is a change in the network. As 
stated before, Risk Assessment in only one of the steps in the Risk Management model 
and the following step should be a detailed analysis of the highest risk elements, where 
prevention and mitigation measures would be studied. Comparing the risk values with 
and without those prevention and mitigation measures and the required investment 
costs, the PT Operator could make informed decisions on where and how to act. If a 
more detailed study on the structural behavior of a specific element is required, a 
structural safety assessment could be performed.  
 
3. Structural assessment for selected threats 
A structural security assessment was performed on one of the elements with the highest 
risk associated with the threats under study. The element in question is the element with 
the label “CF” which has risk levels of 12 for the luggage (25 kg TNT) and 8 for the van 
(1500 kg TNT).  
This element is a three-story building constructed in limestone stonework. This “L” 
shape building, see Figure 3a, is a high value element in the PT Operator, not only 
because of its effect on public opinion but due to its high passenger flow. 
Two different scenarios (see Figure 3b) were studied in this analysis: 
 Scenario A – corresponds to an explosion at a square on the South side of the 
building (at 4 meters from the building façade), as it is a place with possible 
high concentration of people due to the presence of outdoor cafes. The luggage 
size IED (25 kg TNT) was the selected delivery system for this scenario. 
 Scenario B – corresponds to an explosion at the East façade of the building (at 5 
meters from the center of the façade). The van size IED (1500 kg TNT) was the 
selected delivery system for this scenario. Another situation was analyzed – 
Scenario B’ – where the access to vehicles up until 25 meters from the East 
façade was closed. The same delivery system would still be possible, but only at 
25 meters from the center of the façade. 
 
3.1. FEM model 
The FEM model was built in the ABAQUS software, where the Explicit solver was 
used. The definition of the geometric model was based on available drawings but 
without access to the detailed project of the building. This lack of information leads to 
some assumptions, especially regarding the pavements of the building. 
Figure 4 shows the adopted geometry of the building. It is an “L” shaped building with 
around 2300 m2 per floor and external walls having a thickness of 1.0, 0.8 and 0.6 m for 
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd floor, respectively. The stone columns are 0.8×0.8 m2 and 0.4×0.8 m2. 
The dimensions used to construct this model can be seen in Figure 4a. The story heights 
are about 7.7, 6.8 and 6.8 m, from the ground level to the top (Figure 4b). The lower 
ends of the walls at the 1st floor are considered fixed to the ground (0.0 m level). Due to 
lack of information regarding the pavements of the building, different models were 
prepared, neglecting and considering the contribution of pavements.  
The walls were modelled as shell elements and the columns were modelled as beam 
elements. The model was discretized in several parts creating a mesh (Figure 5). This 
mesh was automatically generated by ABAQUS, and then manipulated and controlled 
in order to obtain a good quality mesh. The walls are discretized with quadrilateral 4 
nodes (S4R) and 3 nodes (S3R) shell elements. These are three-dimensional, iso-
parametric, doubly curved thin or thick shell element. These elements have five degrees 
of freedom at each node, reduced integration, hourglass control, and finite membrane 
strain [17]. The columns are discretized with 2-node linear beam elements (B31). The 
final mesh has 55936 elements; it is a rather fine mesh considering the size of the 
building. Shell elements were chosen to diminish the computational time requirements 
for the analyses. 
 
3.1.1. Material model 
The CDP (Concrete Damaged Plasticity) model used in ABAQUS software is a 
modification of the Drucker-Prager model by [18][19].  In particular, the shape of the 
failure surface in the deviatoric plane (Figure 6a) needs not to be a circle and it is 
governed by parameter Kc. This parameter can be interpreted as a ratio of the distances 
between the hydrostatic axis and, respectively, the compression meridian and the 
tension meridian in the deviatoric plane. This ratio is always higher than 0.5 and when it 
assumes the value 1, the deviatoric cross section of the failure surface becomes a circle 
[20]. The CDP model requires four additional parameters to be defined: a) the dilatation 
angle; b) the flow potential eccentricity; c) the ratio of initial equibiaxial compressive 
yield stress to initial uniaxial compressive yield stress; and d) the viscosity parameter. 
For all these five parameters the default values suggested in ABAQUS User’s Manual 
[17] were used (Table 10). Additional information regarding this material model can be 
found in [17]-[21]. 
The CDP model assumes that the failure for tensile cracking and compressive crushing 
of the material is characterized by damage plasticity. The model uses the concept of 
isotropic damage evolution in combination with isotropic tensile and compressive 
plasticity to represent the inelastic and fracture behaviour of the material. The model 
also allows the definition of strain hardening in compression and strain softening in 
tension. The adopted stress-strain curves in tension and compression can be seen in 
Figure 6b and Figure 6c, respectively, with exponential softening in tension and 
parabolic hardening, followed by exponential softening in compression. 
The mechanical properties for the masonry are presented in Table 11 and were collected 
from [22][23]. The data collected from these two sources corresponds to the static 
properties of limestone stonework (Static label). It should be noted that this kind of 
loading introduces high strain rates in the material. UFC 3-340-02 [24] suggests a DIF 
(Dynamic Increase Factor) of 1.19 for the compressive strength of masonry. However, 
other authors such as Hao and Tarasov [25] and Pereira et al [26] presented work where 
higher DIF values for masonry components were achieved, so another set of properties 
was introduced with a DIF of about 1.7 (DIF1.7 label). The DIF values are strain rate 
dependent [25][26], however in order to compare the results with the UFC 3-340-02 
[24] the DIF values were considered constant in the present analyses. 
As stated above, two different situations were considered for the pavements: a) 
neglecting the contribution of the pavements, meaning that the masonry panels are only 
constrained at ground level and at the connections with the other panels; and b) 
considering a generic pavement assuming perfect connections to the walls, introducing 
intermediate constrains at the masonry panels.  This pavement is a reinforced concrete 
slab recent addition, modelled as elastic, with a Young’s modulus of 30 GPa and a 
density of 2400 kg/m3. 
 
3.1.2. Blast loading 
In order to keep this problem as a pure Lagrangian formulation, the blast loading was 
defined as pressure profiles. Knowing the position and the weight, in TNT equivalent, it 
is possible to estimate the pressure profile acting on a specific surface using simple 
empirical equations [13][14]. Figure 7 shows the blast loading distribution for Scenario 
B. Due to the size of the East façade, three zones of loading were defined (L1, L2 and 
L3), each having different standoff distances (R1, R2 and R3). Regarding the North and 
South sides as well as the roof, the standoff distance was measured at one meter 
distance from the edge [14] into the surface itself, and the pressure profile was 
considered constant throughout the entire façade (L4). This same procedure was used to 
distribute the various loading profile for Scenario A and B’. 
For a building with such large dimensions, the effects from both scenarios will be 
mostly localized. In order to decrease the computational time on the analysis, the whole 
structure was divided into two parts (Figure 8): a) Front section, regarding Scenario B 
and B’; and b) Side section, regarding Scenario A. 
 
3.2. Results from the explicit analysis 
ABAQUS Explicit was used to solve the non-linear equations of this problem. This 
software has been used successfully in previous situations regarding similar loading 
conditions [27][28] and similar materials [29][30]. This numerical model was calibrated 
previously using experimental results on masonry walls [31][32]. It must be noted that 
this analysis focuses only on the structural response of the building. Non-structural parts 
of the building, door frames, glazing systems, or occupants were not taken into 
consideration in the present analysis. 
For this kind of analysis it is necessary to define a damage criterion that can be applied 
to categorize the damage on the masonry panels. UFC 3-340-02 [24] classifies the 
damage to unreinforced masonry walls according to the support rotation (Table 12). 
Other authors [33]-[35] state that collapse would occur if the maximum deflection 
reaches the wall thickness. Varma et al [34] reported a 4-level qualitative damage 
criterion based on observation of the wall. For the present work, the criteria defined by 
UFC 3-340-02 [24] will be applied, meaning that the support rotations will be checked 
in order categorize the damage on the masonry panels. 
3.2.1. Scenario A 
Scenario A corresponds to an explosion at a square on the South side of the building 
(Figure 3b). This is a place with possible high concentration of people due to the 
presence of outdoor cafes. An explosion with 25 kg TNT at 4 meters from a surface will 
create a reflected pressure of around 1.5 MPa with duration of 1.4 ms (Figure 9) on the 
panel closest to the explosion. The reflection angle was considered constant at 90º for 
all panels. 
Scenario A was studied with material properties labelled as UFC 3-340-02 (Table 11) 
and considering the contribution of pavements. As it will be shown, this scenario 
represents a low impact loading in the structure, and in order to easily see the results, 
only part of the structure (the closest part to the explosion), will be presented (Figure 
10). 
Table 13 shows the time histories for the deformation and the maximum principal 
plastic strains for this part of the building. The panel on the left, which is closest to the 
explosion, is the first to be loaded. Then the blast wave reaches the panel on the right. 
At this time, the first panel is already unloaded and it is still moving due to the structure 
inertial forces. Although the structure has small displacements, the loading is enough to 
reach the nonlinear behavior of the masonry. As given in Table 13 there is a 
concentration of plastic strains on the right side of the panel on the left. Some cracking 
will occur in this part of the building, although it should be negligible. 
This level of loading is very low for this structure. The closest panel to the explosion 
has a maximum displacement of around 2.75 mm, keeping a 1.5 mm permanent 
displacement after the loading (Figure 11a). The analysis of the support rotations 
(Figure 11b) shows that these are still far away from the failure criteria described 
before. Although only the results from these two panels are shown, the rest of the 
structure was analyzed and, as we move further away from the explosion, the maximum 
deformation of each panel decreases. In fact, apart from the area described above where 
there is a concentration of plastic strains, the structure stay in its elastic regime. 
 
3.2.2. Scenario B 
Scenario B corresponds to an explosion at the East façade of the building, at 5 meters 
from the center of the façade (Figure 3b). This explosion with 1500 kg TNT will create 
a reflected pressure of around 34.5 MPa with duration of 1.7 ms in the L1 region and 
around 2.5 MPa in the L2 region (Figure 12). Scenario B is a close-range large blast, 
and it will generate very high strain rates in the masonry, for this reason this scenario 
was studied with the material properties labelled as DIF1.7 (Table 11), which are 
assumed closer to the actual physical characteristics. Due to the presence of large span 
masonry panels, both situations regarding the pavements (neglecting and considering its 
contribution) were considered and the results were compared. Only the first 30 ms of 
analysis are presented here. Although being possible to capture the complete behavior 
of the structure, 30 ms are enough to reach the collapse of the structure considering the 
damage criteria defined previously. 
Table 14 shows the evolution of deformation for this model. The global response of the 
structure changes if we neglect or consider the contribution of pavements. In the first 
case, the East facade panel behaves as one large masonry panel being supported at 
ground level and on its side edges. In the second case, considering the contribution of 
the pavements, the East façade behaves with intermediate supports along its height, 
similar to three “independent panels”. Due to the dimensions of these panels (very long) 
it is almost as if they were only supported at the bottom and at the top. 
The load resulting from this explosion is quite high and the structure response is quite 
fast. In the first 30 ms the masonry reaches a velocity of around 10 m/s resulting in 
around 300 mm of maximum displacement in the L1 region after 30 ms (Figure 13). 
The difference, in the maximum displacement for the L1 region after 30 ms, neglecting 
or considering pavements in the model is around 17%. When we increase the distance 
from the explosion this difference increases. 
Analyzing the support rotations (Figure 14) it is clear that, in both situations, the 
masonry panel rotates beyond the non-reusable state defined in UFC-3-340-02 [24]. At 
this point, it was considered that this part of the structure would have collapsed. The 
contribution of pavements in the model leads to lower values of rotations at ground 
level (Figure 14b). However, the behavior of the panel in the first floor is closer to one-
way yield pattern which lowers the limit to 1.0º. 
Table 15 shows the evolution of the maximum principal plastic strains. In both cases the 
collapse would occur close to the boundaries of the L1 region. The supports at ground 
level sustain high levels of strains in both cases, but considering pavements, the area at 
the 2nd floor pavement also presents itself with large plastic strains. This is due to the 
intermediate support originated by that pavement. This scenario would have resulted in 
collapse of the structure due to the failure of the central supporting wall. 
 
3.2.3. Scenario B’ 
Scenario B’ corresponds to an explosion at the East façade of the building, at 25 meters 
from the center of the façade (Figure 3b). This simulates the possibility of closing to 
traffic the road right in front of this façade and the application of bollards preventing 
vehicles to get closer to the building. This explosion with 1500 kg TNT will create a 
reflected pressure of around 0.45 MPa with duration of 9.5 ms in the L1 region (Figure 
15). 
In this scenario all three sets of material properties were studied and compared, 
neglecting and considering the pavements contribution. Table 16 and Table 17 show the 
evolution of deformation and the maximum principal plastic strains, neglecting and 
considering the contribution of pavements. These results were plotted with the material 
properties labelled as DIF1.7. The behavior of the masonry panels is similar to the one 
observed in Scenario B. Without pavements, the east façade behaves as one large 
masonry panel supported at ground level and on its sides. With pavements, it is clear the 
“independent panel” behavior at the 3rd floor (Table 17). 
Figure 16 shows the displacement in the L1 region and at 3rd floor. The behavior for 
both possibilities regarding pavements is different. In the first case (Figure 16a) the 
maximum displacement at 3rd floor is achieved at around 0.75 seconds after the blast 
wave reaching the structure while in the second case (Figure 16b) the maximum 
displacement at 3rd floor is reached at around 0.055 s after the arrival of the blast wave. 
In both models the support rotations (Figure 17) are kept under the Reusable limit 
established by UFC-3-340-02 [24]. In the model considering the contribution of 
pavements an additional point was analyzed. As can be seen in Table 16 the maximum 
displacement will take place in the 3rd floor, meaning that the maximum rotation is at 
the 3rd floor level. This last rotation is still under the reusable limit (Figure 17b). 
Although it is not shown here, the rotations at the side edges of the East façade were 
also analyzed and its value are also under safe levels. 
The distribution of stresses and strains for both models is quite different. Table 16 and 
Table 17 show the maximum principal plastic strains for both models. While in the 
model neglecting the contribution of pavements there is a concentration of plastic strain 
at ground level, along the horizontal support (Table 16), in the other model that is not 
observed. In the second model, because the maximum deformation occurs at the 3rd 
floor, there is a concentration of plastic strain at the 3rd floor mid-level (Table 17). 
In order to evaluate the influence of the suggested material properties, a comparison was 
made and the results can be seen in Figure 18. As expected the maximum displacement 
is achieved with the static properties. The maximum displacement with DIF1.7, which 
represents an increase of 70% in the strength and modulus of the material, is around 
68% of the static reference. The dynamic increase factor suggested by UFC 3-340-02 
[24] leads to a maximum displacement of around 92% of the static reference. As 
expected, the selection of material properties has a large influence on the structural 
response. Studies on the dynamic mechanical properties of masonry are still not easily 
found in the open literature and the suggested DIF values on the available standards 
seem to be excessively conservative [25][26]. 
 
4. Conclusions 
A risk assessment model for public transport networks was applied to a case study in a 
Portuguese region and the elements with the highest risk due to external explosions 
were identified. The COUNTERACT methodology, due to the dynamic nature of 
transportation networks, require “real time” monitoring as any changes in the network 
could lead to a different risk matrix. 
From the highest risk group, one element was selected for a detailed analysis. This 
structure was modelled using explicit non-linear dynamics and the results were 
presented for different explosion scenarios. It was shown that a small package explosion 
would have a small impact on the structure while a large package explosion would lead 
to the collapse of the structure. Increasing the standoff distance, as a measure for 
mitigating the impact of the explosion, was analysed and proven to be an effective 
measure, according to the obtained results. This measure is especially important when 
dealing with historical masonry construction where structural strengthening is difficult 
generally due to the historical and cultural value of the structure. 
A comparison was also made for different material properties. Selecting the material 
properties has a major role, due to the large impact on the final results. If possible, in 
situ assessment of material properties should take place to properly grasp the condition 
of existing buildings. Recent research, suggests that the available codes could be 
excessively conservative regarding the dynamic increase factor for material properties. 
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TABLES: 
 
Table 1: Significance justification parameters. 
Significance Justification parameters 
National 
Highlighted element with a high hierarchical national level. Placed with special 
relevance as an image of the Portuguese transport network for the Portuguese and 
foreigner passenger.  
Regional 
Highlighted element at regional level. Placed with special relevance as representative 
of its region. 
An element with National significance has cumulatively Regional significance. 
Also applies if the element is in a district capital. 
Touristic 
Element with particular interest from the tourist point of view as it provides 
accessibility to the tourist area in which it operates. 
Element belonging to a particular transport route with a touristic character. 
Connections with touristic routes, namely with other transport modes. 
Architectural 
Element with recognised historical and architectural significance. 
Element with relevant aesthetics or cultural elements. 
Network 
Element with unique conditions or services regarding an operational point of view. 
Element with historic value regarding the development of the national network. 
 
  
Table 2: Selected examples of key infrastructures scores. 
# Element C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C 
10 AJ 0.78 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.49 
15 AO 0.68 0.88 0.20 0.15 0.37 0.54 
17 AQ 0.78 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.37 0.51 
23 AX 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.04 1.00 0.29 
30 BD 0.43 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.36 0.32 
35 BI 0.75 0.65 0.2 0.15 0.24 0.54 
43 BQ 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.68 0.12 
46 BT 0.01 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.08 
58 CF 1.00 0.23 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.85 
62 CJ 0.89 0.23 0.20 0.60 0.31 0.62 
 
  
Table 3: Probability of occurrence [11]. 
Very 
High 
5 
The threat can be executed at any time and/or has been executed within the 
organization repeatedly. 
High 4 
It has to be reckoned with the threat being executed repeatedly. The threat has been 
executed within the own organization once. 
Possible 3 
An execution of the threat has to be reckoned with. The threat has been executed 
repeatedly within other PT operations world-wide, or at least once within a PT 
operation in the own/ neighbouring country. 
Low 2 
The threat is executed rarely, but has been executed in isolated cases in other 
organizations (world-wide). 
Very 
Unlikely 
1 
An execution of the threat is extremely unlikely, and the threat has never been 
executed in other PT operations before. 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Examples of previous terrorist attacks on PT Operators using explosives. 
Place Year Fatalities Description 
Angola 2001 252 Used an explosive device to derail a train and attack the 
passengers with fire weapons. 
Refiganj, India 2002 130 Derail a trail over a bridge. 
Stavropol Krai, 
Russia 
2003 46 Suicide bomber in a train. 
Moscow, Russia 2004 41 Suicide bomber at the subway station Avtozavodskaya. 
Madrid, Spain 2004 191 Several explosions in the railway system. 
London, UK 2005 56 Three explosions at subway stations and one explosion in a bus. 
Mumbai, India 2006 209 Several explosions in the suburban system. 
Moscow, Russia 2010 40 Two suicide bombers at subway stations, Lubyanka and Park 
Kultury. 
Moscow, Russia 2011 35 Suicide bomber at Domodedovo airport. 
 
  
Table 5: Probability of occurrence for the PT Operator. 
# Element Vest Luggage Car Van Truck 
1 AA 3 3 2 2 1 
5 AE 3 3 2 2 1 
19 AS 3 3 2 2 1 
20 AT 3 3 2 2 1 
21 AU 3 3 2 2 1 
22 AV 3 3 2 2 1 
25 AY 3 3 2 2 1 
27 BA 3 3 2 2 1 
58 CF 3 3 2 2 1 
59 CG 3 3 2 2 1 
62 CJ 3 3 2 2 1 
66 CO 3 3 2 2 1 
72 CU 1 1 1 1 1 
73 CV 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
  
Table 6: Impact/Severity [11]. 
  
Consequences for 
Persons 
Consequences for 
Property/Environment 
Consequences for PT 
Operator and Services 
Disastrous 4 
Several deaths and/or 
numerous severe injuries 
Most severe damage to 
property and/or 
environment 
Loss of vital functions 
and/or operation over a long 
period of time 
Critical 3 
Low number of deaths 
and/or severely injured 
Severe damage to property 
and/or environment 
Loss of vital functions 
and/or operation over a short 
period of time 
Marginal 2 Light casualties 
Notable damage to 
property and/or 
environment 
Minor impact on functions 
and/or operation. 
Uncritical 1 
Possibility of few light 
casualties 
Small damage to property 
and/or environment 
No impact on functions 
and/or operation 
 
  
Table 7: Severity of occurrence for the PT Operator. 
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AA 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 
AE 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 
AS 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 
AT 3 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 
AU 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 4 4 3 
AV 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 
AY 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 
BA 3 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 
CF 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 4 4 2 
CG 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 
CJ 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 
CO 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 4 3 
CU 2 1 3 2 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 4 2 4 4 
CV 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 3 
 
 
  
Table 8: Risk categories [11]. 
Categories Score Action Required 
Intolerable 15 – 20 Must be avoided or Impact must be mitigated as far as possible 
Precarious 8 – 12 
Shall only be accepted if the efforts for prevention and/or mitigation of 
impact is unreasonably high 
Tolerable 4 – 6 Shall be accepted, but threat needs to be assessed regularly 
Negligible 1 – 3 Shall be accepted 
 
  
Table 9: Risk matrix for the PT Operator. 
# Element Vest Luggage Car Van Truck 
1 AA 9 12 6 6 4 
5 AE 6 9 6 6 4 
19 AS 6 9 6 6 3 
20 AT 9 9 6 6 4 
21 AU 9 12 6 6 4 
22 AV 6 9 6 6 3 
25 AY 6 9 6 6 4 
27 BA 9 9 6 8 4 
58 CF 9 12 6 8 4 
59 CG 6 9 6 6 4 
62 CJ 9 12 6 6 4 
66 CO 9 12 6 6 4 
72 CU 3 3 3 4 4 
73 CV 2 2 2 3 4 
 
 
  
Table 10: Default parameters of the CDP model [17]. 
Parameter Value 
Dilatation angle (Ψ) 20º 
Eccentricity (ε) 0.1 
fb0/fc0 1.16 
Kc 0.667 
Viscosity parameter (µ) 0.0 
 
 
  
Table 11: Mechanical properties (σt0 is the tensile strength, σc0 is the elastic limit of the 
uniaxial compressive stress, σcu is the compressive strength, E0 is the Young’s modulus 
and ρ is the specific weight). 
Parameter Static UFC-3-340-02 DIF1.7 
σt0 [MPa] 0.2 0.2 0.4 
σc0 [MPa] 4.5 5.2 7.5 
σcu [MPa] 6.0 7.0 10.0 
E0 [GPa] 4.5 4.5 7.5 
ρ [kN/m3] 24 24 24 
 
  
Table 12: Unreinforced masonry damage criteria [24]. 
Element Yield pattern Maximum support rotation 
Masonry Reusable 
One-way 0.5º 
Two-way 0.5º 
Masonry Non-reusable One-way 1.0º 
Two-way 2.0º 
 
 
  
Table 13: Time histories for scenario A: deformed mesh and location of the maximum 
principal plastic strains. 
 Deformed mesh Location of the max. principal plastic strain 
t =
 0
 m
s 
  
t =
 1
0 
m
s 
  
t =
 4
0 
m
s 
  
  
Table 14: Deformed mesh time history for scenario B: with and without pavements. 
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Table 15: Time history of the location of the maximum principal plastic strains for 
scenario B: with and without pavements. 
 Without pavements With pavements 
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Table 16: Scenario B’ neglecting pavements: deformed mesh and location of the 
maximum principal strains. 
 Deformed mesh Location of the max. principal strains 
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Table 17: Scenario B’ considering pavements: deformed mesh and location of the 
maximum principal strains. 
 Deformed mesh Location of the max. principal strains 
t =
 0
 m
s 
  
t =
 3
0 
m
s 
  
t =
 6
0 
m
s 
  
 
 
 
FIGURES: 
 
Figure 1: Risk management model. 
 
  
 Figure 2: Maximum pressure as a function of the standoff distance. 
  
  
a) b) 
Figure 3: Element “CF”: a) building schematics; b) scenarios under study. 
 
  
 
 
a) b) 
Figure 4: Adopted geometry: a) first floor; b) wall section. 
  
 Figure 5: FEM mesh of the building. 
 
  
   
a) b) c) 
Figure 6: CDP material model: a) failure surface, represented in the deviatoric plane S1, 
S2 and S3; b) stress-strain relation in tension; c) stress-strain relation in compression 
[20]. 
  
 Figure 7: Blast loading distribuition. 
 
  
 Figure 8: Sections of the building for different scenarios. 
 
  
 Figure 9: Pressure profiles for scenario A. 
 
  
 Figure 10: FEM mesh of the side section. 
 
  
   
a) b) 
Figure 11: Time histories: a) displacement; b) rotations at supports. 
 
 
  
 Figure 12: Pressure profiles for scenario B in the L1 and L3 regions of the front section. 
 
  
 a) b) 
Figure 13: Displacement time history for scenario B: a) neglecting pavements; 
b) considering pavements. 
 
  
   
a) b) 
Figure 14: Rotations time history for scenario B: a) neglecting pavements; 
b) considering pavements. 
 
  
 Figure 15: Pressure profiles for scenario B’. 
 
  
 a) b) 
Figure 16: Displacement time history for scenario B’: a) neglecting pavements; 
b) considering pavements. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 17: Rotations time history for scenario B’: a) neglecting pavements; 
b) considering pavements. 
 
  
 Figure 18: Maximum displacement for different material properties. 
